Two Faces of Populism: Comparing Europe's Right and Latin America's Left

The Populist Divergence

Populism has emerged as one of the most consequential political phenomena of the twenty-first century, reshaping party systems and governance across continents. While populist movements share fundamental characteristics—particularly opposition to established elites and claims to represent "the people" against a corrupt system—their manifestations in Europe and Latin America reveal striking differences in ideology, constituency, and policy objectives. These regional variations reflect distinct historical trajectories, economic conditions, and social cleavages that shape how populist leaders mobilize support and exercise power.

In Europe, right-wing populist parties have achieved remarkable electoral gains in recent years, with significant victories in Italy, Sweden, France, and Hungary. These movements typically combine anti-establishment rhetoric with opposition to immigration, particularly from Muslim-majority countries, and skepticism toward the European Union. Parties such as Italy's Brothers of Italy, Sweden Democrats, France's National Rally, and Hungary's Fidesz have capitalized on anxieties about national identity, cultural change, and economic security among working and lower-middle class voters. Their appeal rests on promises to protect traditional values, restrict immigration, and reclaim sovereignty from supranational institutions.

The rise of European right-wing populism accelerated following the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent European debt crisis, which eroded confidence in mainstream political parties and technocratic governance. The 2015 refugee crisis further catalyzed these movements, providing a visible symbol of globalization's disruptions and enabling populists to frame immigration as an existential threat to national identity and social cohesion. European right-wing populists typically maintain neoliberal economic positions, emphasizing market efficiency over redistribution, while focusing their critique on cultural and identity issues rather than economic inequality.

Latin American populism presents a markedly different profile. Since the 1930s and 1940s, populism has been far more prevalent in Latin America than in Europe, becoming deeply embedded in the region's political tradition. The twenty-first century witnessed a "pink tide" of left-wing populist governments, including Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Néstor and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina. These leaders combined populist anti-elite rhetoric with explicitly socialist programs emphasizing wealth redistribution, nationalization of key industries, and expanded social welfare.

Latin American left-wing populism emerged from the region's stark economic inequalities and histories of oligarchic rule. These movements mobilized support among the poor and marginalized, promising to redistribute resources from wealthy elites to the masses through expansionary fiscal policies, increased public spending, and direct cash transfers. Unlike their European counterparts, Latin American populists explicitly championed the interests of indigenous peoples, workers, and peasants, often framing their struggles in anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal terms. They pursued constitutional reforms to strengthen presidential power and weaken institutional constraints, frequently calling constituent assemblies to draft new constitutions that could be ratified through referendums.

The ethnic dimension provides another key distinction. Research indicates that populism in Latin America is more explicitly ethnic than in Europe, with leaders like Evo Morales directly appealing to indigenous identities and framing political struggles through ethnic lenses. European populists, while emphasizing national identity, typically avoid explicit ethnic appeals in favor of cultural and civilizational arguments, though this varies by context and some Eastern European movements exhibit more ethnonationalist characteristics.

Critically, the difference between right-wing European populism and left-wing Latin American populism primarily reflects their affiliated ideologies rather than the populism itself. Both varieties employ similar rhetorical strategies—constructing an antagonistic relationship between "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite," claiming to embody the people's will, and promising to bypass intermediary institutions to restore popular sovereignty. The divergence lies in how they define "the people" and identify enemies: European right-wing populists emphasize cultural homogeneity and native identity, while Latin American left-wing populists stress class solidarity and economic justice.

However, Latin American populism is not monolithic. The region has recently witnessed the emergence of right-wing populist leaders, including Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, and Javier Milei in Argentina. These figures share characteristics with European right-wing populists—tough-on-crime stances, appeals to traditional values, and mobilization of middle-class resentments—while maintaining neoliberal economic positions that distinguish them from North American and European populist protectionism. This suggests that populism's ideological coloring depends heavily on historical context, economic conditions, and the specific grievances available for political mobilization.

In terms of democratic impact, both varieties raise concerns about institutional erosion. European right-wing populists have undermined judicial independence, attacked media freedom, and weakened checks and balances, particularly in Hungary and Poland. Latin American left-wing populists similarly concentrated executive power, weakened opposition, and manipulated electoral rules, as evidenced in Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro. The common thread is populism's antipathy toward institutional pluralism and liberal constraints on majority rule, though the specific mechanisms of democratic backsliding vary across cases.

Public attitudes toward populism also differ regionally. In Europe, despite electoral gains, most populist parties remain broadly unpopular among general populations, rarely receiving majority favorable ratings except in Hungary. Electoral success often results from low turnout, fragmented opposition, and proportional representation systems rather than overwhelming public endorsement. In Latin America, populist leaders have historically commanded stronger popular support, particularly when economic growth enabled redistributive spending, though support tends to erode during economic crises.

The electoral trajectory of populism shows divergent patterns. In Europe, right-wing populist parties have steadily increased their vote shares over recent decades, moving from fringe status to governing coalitions or even outright victory. In Latin America, left-wing populism has experienced cycles of advance and retreat, with the early 2000s pink tide giving way to center-right governments in several countries, followed by renewed left-wing victories in Mexico, Chile, and Colombia. This cyclical pattern reflects Latin America's volatility and the tendency of populist economic policies to generate boom-bust cycles.